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3Motivation and Background
• Asymmetric thrust cited as cause of several 
loss of control aviation incidents and accidents
• Crew response may be inappropriate and 
exacerbate the situation
• Need recognition and response to unintended 
asymmetric thrust conditions
• Feasibility study initiated to evaluate three 
asymmetric thrust detection methods
4Typical Sequence for Propulsion System Malfunction 
Plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR)
Autopilot and 
autothrottle active
Failure occurs
Unintended 
asymmetric thrust 
occurs
Automated flight 
controls manage 
asymmetry
Flight controls reach 
limits
Control returned to 
flight crew
Limited time, 
control authority, 
information 
available
Potential for 
inappropriate crew 
response and loss of 
control
5Example PSM+ICR
Event #74 in PSM+ICR Report
• March 31, 1995, Flight 371 for Tarom Romanian Airlines (Airbus A310), 
departs Balotesti, Romania for Brussels, Belgium
• Autothrottle was engaged as the aircraft was ascending through 2,000 ft
when the flaps were retracted
• With reduction in drag from flaps, the autothrottle moved to decrease 
power
• However, number 2 (right) engine throttle was stuck in the take-off 
throttle position
• To reduce airspeed, the number 1 (left) engine throttle was decreased 
until it went to idle developing an asymmetric thrust condition
• Asymmetric thrust was not apparent since the aircraft was in a left turn 
for a heading change
• Roll due to thrust asymmetry was not noticed until the pitch attitude 
suddenly dropped
• Aircraft continued to roll over and crashed with no survivors
“Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR), Aerospace Industries Association and the 
European Association of Aerospace Industries Project Report, Vol. 1, November 1 (1998). 
6Asymmetric Thrust Detection Methods
• Two methods based on 
estimated thrust for 
cross wing comparison 
of two engines
– Kalman Filter 
– Table Lookup
7Estimated Thrust: Kalman Filter Method
• Piecewise linear model used to estimate non-measured 
parameters
• Kalman filter provides estimates that account for 
performance degradation over time
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ˆˆ x – state vector 
y – sensed output vector 
u – actuator command vector
z – unmeasured output vector (net thrust)
A,B,C,D,F,G – state space matrices
K – Kalman gain matrix  
8Estimated Thrust: Table Lookup Method
• Thrust tables calculated over 
entire flight envelope 
– Altitude 
– Mach 
– Fan Speed
• Thrust tables reduced through 
parameter correction to sea 
level conditions
– Mach 
– Fan Speed
Altitude
Mach
Fan Speed
Fan Speed
Mach
9Thrust Estimation Asymmetric Detection Logic
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Asymmetric Thrust Detection Methods
• One method based on 
engine pressure ratio to 
compare commanded vs 
sensed signals for one 
engine
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Engine Pressure Ratio Method and Detection 
Logic
• Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) 
– 𝐸𝑃𝑅 =
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
=
𝑃5
𝑃2
– Commanded
– Sensed
• EPR Method for Asymmetric Thrust Detection Logic
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Results
• Asymmetric thrust detection sensitivity study
– Accuracy of detection methods determined from 
Monte Carlo study to establish statistical baseline
• Piloted flight simulation evaluation
– Real time demonstration of typical asymmetric 
thrust conditions 
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Linear Turbofan Engine Model Example
The asymmetric thrust detection methods were evaluated 
using the NASA Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion 
System Simulation 40k (C-MAPSS40k) high-bypass 
turbofan engine model. 
Sensor Measurements
Nf Fan speed
Nc Core speed
P2 Inlet total pressure
T2 Inlet total temperature
P25 HPC inlet total pressure
T25
HPC inlet total 
temperature
Ps3 HPC exit static pressure
T3
HPT exit total 
temperature
P5 LPT exit total pressure
T5
LPT exit total 
temperature
Actuators
Wf Fuel flow
VSV
Variable stator 
vane
VBV
Variable bleed 
valve
Inputs
Alt Altitude
MN Mach number
PLA Power lever angle
dTamb
Ambient temperature deviation
relative to standard day conditions
Det Performance deterioration level
Noise
Measurement noise enabled or
disabled (discrete input)
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Statistical Baseline
Method Threshold Persistency False Alarms
Kalman filter 0.187 % 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials
Table lookup 0.087 % 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials
Sensed and commanded EPR 
comparison
0.95% 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials
Monte Carlo Simulation Results
• Based on data from commercial aircraft flight profiles
• 216 data sets of 10 minute segments of cruise condition flight 
data with no thrust asymmetry played back through C-MAPSS40k
• Simulated engine deterioration and sensor noise provided realistic 
variance in the data 
• Establish common false positive rate of 2 per 216 trials
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Statistical Baseline
Method
Average percent of 
corrected thrust asymmetry 
at  time of detection 
Standard Deviation
Kalman filter 0.9664% 2.7792%
Table lookup 0.7647% 2.1976%
Sensed and commanded EPR 
comparison
2.7672% 4.0936%
Monte Carlo Failure Simulation Results  
• Uncommanded linear increase in PLA introduced to one engine
• Simulated engine deterioration and sensor noise provided realistic 
variance in the data 
• Average percent of corrected thrust at time of detection calculated 
for all 216 trials
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Flight Simulator
• In original configuration, the NASA Glenn flight simulator is a FAA 
approved Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD)
• For this study, it was configured to operate the Transport Class Model 
(TCM) developed by NASA Langley with two copies of C-MAPSS40K 
developed by NASA Glenn
• Asymmetric thrust conditions were introduced with pilot-in-the-loop to 
examine pilot reactions and to visualize the dynamic effect on the aircraft
17
Flight Simulator Results
18
Conclusions
• Realistic asymmetric thrust events were successfully tested 
with the NASA Glenn flight simulator
• All three methods were capable of detecting the current 
industry standard of 10% thrust asymmetry 
• Additional studies would need to investigate applicability and 
methods for annunciation of an asymmetric condition to the 
pilot 
• Investigate a hybrid of two methods to provide detection and 
engine identification 
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